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IN THE

SUPRE~!E

COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JOANN E. BOOTH, aka JOANN
E. CROt1PTON,
Plaintiff & Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 15,276

ROBERT CROMPTON,
Defendant & Appellant.
BRIEF OF hPPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action on a foreign divorce decree to enforce payment of arrearages in support obligations.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court found

th~

plaintiff-respondent entitled

to judgment against the defendant-appellant in the amount of
$11,220.65.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-appellant claims that the decision of the
trial court was erroneous in that the plaintiff-respondent
had assigned her rights to the cause of action, and was not
entitled to bring it or to have judgment thereon.
FACTS OF THE CASE
Plaintiff-respondent Mrs. Crompton 1 and defendantappellant Robert Crompton were divorced by a decree of the

1
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Clackamas County, Oregon, Court,
46).

filed July 9, 1969.

(R.

The decree provided for payment by Robert Ceompton of

$150.00 pee month child support.

( R,

4 7).

This amount was reduced to $100.00 pee month on February 1, 1974.

(Exhibit 1).

Though Me. Crompton was

irregular in making payments, he paid a substantial amount,
exhibited by his receipts and by a copy of a payment eecod
kept by the Oregon Court.

(Exhibits 4 und 1).

Mrs. Ceomptor

sought judicial enforcement of present support payments
several times, but never sought payment of delinquencies.
(T. 5:30-6:7).
During this period of time, Mes. Ceompton received
welfare payments for support from the State of Oregon.
7:22-26).

This was apparently done under the Oregon

(R.

URE~

program (Uniform Reciprocal Support Act, O.R.S. Chaptee 1101
since Mr. Crompton was then required to make his suppoet
payments to the clerk of the county court.

(See Exhibit 1).

Mrs. Crompton testified that she assigned all her rights to
support payments to the state of Oeegon.
is consistent with URESA peactice.

(R. 8:8-18).

This

See O.R.S. §110.081 and

Utah Code Ann. 77-6la-8.
The defendant-appellant Robert Crompton has continuously maintained that Mes. Crompton cannot sue torecover the obligation assigned to the State of Oregon.
his Answee, he stated:
Defendant affiematjvely alleges th~t if,
in filet, there is anv sum of money unpairl
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by the defendant to the plaintiff, that
the plaintiff has duly and regularly assigned
all of her right, title, and interest in
and to that payment to the State of Oregon
and that the plaintiff has no further right,
title, or interest in and to her alleged
claim.
(R. 31).
In examination of Mrs. Crompton at trial, defendant
pursued this theory, and elicited an admission of the
assignment.
Q.
[Mr. Lewis] And when did you go off
receiving assistance?
A.
[Mrs. Crompton] I think in JanuaryFebruary, because I started a work program
in which I was going to college, which now
I am still working under a program.
Q.

January or February of this year?

A.
Yes, because I have been in this
school for nine months, almost.
Q.
Is it safe to say then that up till
that time all the rights you had have been
assigned to the State of Oregon while you
are receiving assistance?

A.

That the support payments were, yes.

(R. 8:8-18)
Though the court found against the defendant-appellant on
the effect of the assignments, defendant again raised the
issue in objecting to the proposed findings of fact:
Defendant objects to the Court's Finding
No. 5 upon the grounds and for the reasons
that the uncontradicted testimony of the
claintiff was that she had assigned all
~[ her interest in and to the support pay~ents, thereby leaving her not a proper
party to the herein action and having no
interest therein.
(R. 45).
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and also in objecting to the conclusion of law:
Defendant objects to the Conclusion of
Law of the Court since the Conclusions are
not based upon the facts as presented to
the Court, that the plaintiff, by her own
testimony, stated that all of her right,
title and interest has been assigned to
the State of Oregon and that she is not
a proper plaintiff, and that the complaint
should be dismissed.
(R. 46).
Nevertheless, the court found:
That the plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the defendant in the amount
of $11,220.65.
(R. 28, Conclusion •2).
The court handled the assignment issue in the following
manner:
. the State of Oregon may be entitled
to all or a part of this judgment and if
so, the State of Oregon would be entitled
to an appropriate assignment from this
plaintiff in that amount.
Appellant maintains that the lower court acted against
the weight of the evidence in failing to find an assignment
and manifestly misapplied the law in failing to bar Mr~.
Crompton from asserting claims in which she had no interest.
POINT I
THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ENCOMPASSES BOTH FACTUAL
AND LEGAL ISSUES.
In equitable actions appellate review traditionally
encompasses both the law and the facts.

This broad scope

review is warranted because the original trial involved no
finder of fact other than a judge, so the appellate court
may easily place itself in the position of the trier ot
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of

fact, which is not possible in review of jury trials.

Some

jurisdictions have even adopted a trial de novo review of
equity cases in their supreme courts.
Vehrs,

See e.g., Smith v.

242 P. 2d 586 (Ore. 1952).

Utah, while not providing for a trial de novo procedure
in equitable proceedings, does provide for appellate review
of the record on both legal and factual issues.

This scope

of review of equity cases is founded in the Utah Constitution.
The appeal shall be upon the record made
in the court below . . . In equity cases
the appeal may be on questions of both
law and fact. . •
(Utah Canst. art. 8,
§9).

Essentially the same language is found in Rule 72(a) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
In equity cases the appeal may be on
questions of both law and fact.
Thus, where the decision below was bottomed in equity and
where the appellant questions the findings of fact, it is
the duty of the appellate court to review the accuracy of
both the findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Under Article VIII, Section IX, Constitution
of Utah, it is both the duty and prerogative
of this court in an equitable action to review the law and the facts and make its own
findings and substitute its judgment for
that of the trial court.
Mitchell v.
~litchell, 527 P.2d 1359, 1360 (Utah 1974)).
See also Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Utah 57, 276 P. 912, 69 A.L.R.
1416 (1928).
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That this Court has such broad review power is evidenced
by the customary appellate disposition of equity cases where
the evidence is not found lacking.

Generally, this Court

has not remanded equity cases after appellate review, but
rather has entered or directed judgment.
In view, therefore, that this is purely an
equitable proceeding which comes to this
court upon questions of both law and fact,
we have the power, and it is our duty, to
either make findings and render judgment
in accordance with the facts and the law
applicable thereto, or direct that such
findings and judgment be made and entered
by the court below.
(Johnson v. Seagull
Inv. Co., 65 Utah 424, 237 P. 945 (1925).
See also St. George and Washington Canal Co. v. Hurricane
Canal Co., 93 Utah 262, 72 P.2d 642 (1937).
in a recent Oklahoma case, Matter of Reyna,

As was stated
546 P.2d 622,

(Okla. 1976):
In a case of equitable cognizance, the
Supreme Court may weigh the evidence
and enter such judgment as the trial
court should have rendered.
( 546 P. 2d
at 625).
Entry of judgment by the appellate court is made
following the review of equity cases because the appellate
court has full power to find the facts, make conclusions of
law, and enter judgment.

Of course, where the court feels

there is more necessary evidence available, not in the
record,

it nay remand for further taking of evidence, either

retaining the case for proceedings after the further evidenc,
is gathered or remanding it entirely for both findings an~
conclusions in the lower court.
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Appellant contends that the finding relating to the
assignment does not reflect the testimony at trial.

For

this reason, review of the factual finding as well as the
legal conclusion, as to the effect of the assignment is
sought by the appellant.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE UNEQUIVOCALLY INDICATES AN ASSIGNMENT.
The trial court refused to make an unequivocal finding
as to the assignment in favor of the State of Oregon, saying
only that if such an assignment existed, the State of Oregon
would be entitled to an assignment in its favor.
The unequivocal, uncontradicted evidence was that such
an assignment existed.
this testimony.

In fact, the respondent herself gave

(T. 8:8-18).

In the absence of any evidence

to contradict the testimony of assignment, it was clearly
improper to enter the equivocal finding.

As stated in

Corbet v. Corbet, 24 Utah 2d 378, 472 P.2d 430 (1970) this
court will reverse factual findings of the trial court when
those findings are clearly preponderated against the evidence
in the record.

Surely, where the trial court has declined

to find an assignment in the face of a clear admission of an
2ssignm~nt,

this court should reverse the lower court's

finding.
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POINT III
THE COURT MANIFESTLY MISAPPLIED THE LAW TO THE FACTS C
THIS CASE.
In light of the clear testimony of an assignment, it
was manifestly improper for the trial court to allow judgment for the plaintiff-respondent in the amount of all the
arrearages,
A.

including claims assigned to the State of Orego:
An Assignor is not entitled to sue on
ass1gned claims.

The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure require that actions
be "prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest".
U.R.C.f>. l7{a).
law.

This requirement has a long history in Uta'.

In IVilson v.

Kiesel,

9 Utah 377,

35 P.

488 (1894) this

court noted that Utah statutes required "that every action
must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.
35 P.2d at 491,

citing 2 Comp. Laws of Utah 1888 §3169.

That case held that an assignor had no right to prosecute a,.
action on an assigned claim.
That the assignee of a claim is the proper party to
bring suit is affirmed in Lynch v. MacDonald, 12 Utah 2d
427, 367 P. 2d 464 ( 1962).

The reason for

this rule is that

an assignor has no further interest in the claim, and havinc!
received a valuable consideration for making the assignment,
would be unjustly enriched if permitted to recover on a
claim after having assigned it.

The policy of the rule is

especially applicable in this present case, where Mrs.
Cronpton has receive~] suppc)l·t payroent·> froil Lilc State of
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O~egon

in return fo~ he~ assignment, and now seeks to recover

a~rearages

sat ion.

for which the State of Oregon has made compen-

The State of Oregon has the right to those claims.

For an example of a case in which couLts have barred
assignors from suit, see Acme Blackshop Paving Co. v.
Brown & Matthews, Inc.,

31 A.D.2d 1042, 294 N.Y.S.2d 826

(1968).
Clearly, an assignor is not entitled to maintain an
action on a claim in which the assignor has no interest.
B.

Respondent assigned her rights to support
prior to January, 1976, to the State of
Oregon.

Respondent, by her own testimony, asslgned her rights
to support payments prior to January, 1976,
Oregon,
18)

to the State of

in return for state assistance payments.

(R. 8:8-

The right assigned was founded on the divorce decree

filed July 9, 1969, and as modified February l, 1974.

Under

the decree, periodic payments were to be made to the respondent

M~s.

Crompton.

In such a continuing obligation the

right is not to be a lump sum but to the recurrent installments.
The obligation can best be vic·wed as several obligations,
with due dates falling monthly, one
M~s.

afte~

another.

While

Crompton is entitled to payments not assigned, she is

not entitled to

pay~cnts

assigned, during her receipt of

By her own arlmission she assigned all
pay~ents

p~ior

to JJnuary, 1976.

In a si1~ila~ case, whe~c there was an assignment of
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assignoc, this Couct has adheced to the rule that the
assignee i3 the propec party to sue on the assigned claims.
Chesney v. District Couct
108 P.2d 514 (1941).
C.

of Salt Lake County, 99 Utah 513,

That rule should apply in this case.

Respondent is not entitled to amounts
accrued pr1or to January, 1976.

Clearly in light of the admission of assignment, and

1r.

light of the law stating that an assignor has no right to
bring an action on an assigned claim,

it is manifestly

apparent that the lower court misapplied the law to these
facts.

Where such is the case, this Court may cocrect the

judgment below.

See Elton v. Utah State Retirement Board,

28 Utah 2d 368, 503 P.2d 137 ( 1972) for a statement of this
rule.
Appellant urges a correction of the findings to reflect
the admitted assignments in favor of the State of Ocegon;
and a correction of the judgment to include the net amount
accrued since January, 1976.
CONCLUSION
The evidence at trial could not have been more cogent
in establishing an assignment of support payments in favor
of the State of Oregon.

Appellant raised his objection to

respondent's assertion of assi•JrH'cl claims at all arpropriatc
times.

The e q u i t i c s c e r t a in l y

cl n

not fa 'Jot- an a"' a nl
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tu

Reversal or amendment of the judgment to include only
the amounts accrued since January 1976, less payments made,
is respectfully
DATED this

req~ed.

& 1 day
/

of

Oc~tober,/7

~

-~

S.
L
;::,
or:
HOW D, LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah
84601
Attorneys for Appellant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

day of October, 1977,

I personally mailed two (2) copies of the foregoing Brief of
Appellant to

~lr.

D. John Musselman, Attorney for Respondent,

1325 South BOO East, Suite 310, Orem, Utah

84057.
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